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SOCIAL BARGAINING IN STATES AND CITIES:
TOWARD A MORE EGALITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC WORKPLACE LAW
Kate Andrias*
Paper prepared for Harvard Law School Symposium
“Could Experiments at the State and Local Levels Expand Collective Bargaining
and Workers’ Collective Action?”
A well-documented problem motivates this symposium: The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) does not effectively protect workers’ rights to organize, bargain,
and strike. Though unions once represented a third of American workers, today the vast
majority of workers are non-union and employed “at will.” The decline of organization
among workers is a key factor contributing to the rise of economic and political
inequality in American society. 1 Yet reforming labor law at the federal level—at least
in a progressive direction—is currently impossible. Meanwhile, broad preemption
doctrine means that states and localities are significantly limited in their ability to address
the weaknesses in labor law, even where local politics would permit such gains.
Employment law, however, does not face the same preemption hurdles as labor
law, leaving room for experimentation at the state and local level. This is important not
only because traditional employment law is a critical tool for improving workers’ lives,
but also because labor and employment law ought not be understood as separate
categories. Like labor law, employment law can be a tool for strengthening civil society
and protecting workers’ collective voice. For example, employment law can empower
worker organizations by engaging them in enforcement activity2 and by deputizing them
to administer benefits.3 Its provisions can protect concerted activity.4 In addition,
*
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employment law can be used to enable a form of sectoral bargaining through which
workers and employers, in conjunction with pubic officials and the general public,
negotiate workplace standards at the sectoral level rather than at the firm level.5
In this brief essay, I will consider how states and localities can use tripartite
commissions or wage boards to enable public sectoral bargaining—what I will call
“social bargaining”—consistent with federal preemption doctrine and other legal
constraints.6 I refer to these social bargaining mechanisms as “tripartite” because, at a
general level, they include representation from three categories: workers, business, and
the public. In practice, however, they typically are, and should be, multi-partite with
individuals representing a range of worker, business, and public interests.
To be sure, a full-fledged system of social bargaining would require new federal
legislation. Yet a state and local approach offers promise in the interim. State and local
commissions or wage boards can involve worker organizations, business organizations,
and the public in decisions about wages, benefits, and working conditions. In so doing,
they can increase wages and improve conditions for workers throughout the economy;
they can augment the role of civil society in administration; and they can help strengthen
worker organizations, particularly if combined with other reforms.7
I.

Why Social Bargaining?

Most industrial democracies empower unions to negotiate for workers on a
sectoral basis.8 Through one method or another, the government extends unionnegotiated standards to workers throughout the economy, while workers also have rights
of participation at the shop level through, for example, works councils, local unions, or
4

Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008).
Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016); see also DAVID ROLF, THE
FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN 253-58 (2016); David Rolf, Toward a 21st Century Labor Movement, AM.
PROSPECT (Apr. 18, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/toward-21st-century-labor-movement;
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(2016). For one account of how all these reforms fit together, see DAVID MADLAND, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, THE FUTURE OF WORKER VOICE AND POWER (2016) [hereinafter FUTURE OF
WORKER VOICE]; see also David Madland & Alex Rowell, How State and Local Governments
Can Strengthen Worker Power and Raise Wages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 2, 2017),
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For further discussion, see infra Parts III & IV.
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sectoral bargaining. See Andrias, supra note 5. I do not reiterate those arguments here.
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See STEVEN J. SILVIA, HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER 27-28, 38-41 (2013); Franz Traxler &
Martin Behrens, Collective Bargaining Coverage and Extension Procedures, EURWORK (Dec.
17,
2002),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparativeinformation/collective-bargaining-coverage-and-extension-procedures.
5

2

competing minority unions.9 In many systems, unions also play a crucial role in
administering benefits, giving workers an incentive to join unions.10
Contemporary American labor law, however, does not affirmatively grant unions
power to negotiate on behalf of all workers in a given sector; rather, it channels most
negotiations about wages and benefits to the firm level.11 At the same time, U.S. law
makes organizing and bargaining at the firm level extraordinarily difficult and permits
significant resistance by employers.12 The result is that the vast majority of workers are
unrepresented by unions and uncovered by agreements reached by unions. Meanwhile,
employment law is generally considered a separate regime under which workers are
individually entitled to rights but concerning which unions have no special role.13
In the last several years, a number of worker movements, as well as a host of
scholars, have begun to challenge this paradigm.14 The worker movements have
intensified their focus on organizing at a sectoral level. They have also tried to engage
governments, as well as employers, in efforts to raise wages and improve working
conditions, as part-and-parcel of the organizing campaigns. From these struggles, I have
argued, one can glimpse the outlines of an alternative form of labor law—a labor law that
aspires to social bargaining.15
The social bargaining approach—i.e., government-mandated sectoral bargaining
that addresses a range of issues of concern to workers—has significant advantages. First,
and perhaps most important, it is more effective than firm-based bargaining in reducing
economic inequality.16 Researchers have shown that firm-based bargaining compresses
wages within the firm at which it occurs.17 Yet, it tends to raise wages throughout an
industry only if there is enough union presence in the industry or geographic area to pose
a threat to non-unionized firms; employers raise wages to stave off unionization or to
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See Andrias, supra note 5, at 6, 33-34,77-80; MADLAND, FUTURE OF WORKER VOICE,
supra note 5.
10
Dimick, supra note 3.
11
See Andrias, supra note 5, at 6, 28-32. The original New Deal briefly promised, though
never fully achieved, a more sectoral system that integrated labor and employment law. Kate
Andrias, Rethinking Labor’s Administration, The Lost Promise of FLSA’s Wage Boards (draft).
12
See Andrias, supra note 5, at 25-27.
13
Id. at 37-40.
14
See sources cited supra notes 1-5.
15
Andrias, supra note 5.
16
KATHLEEN THELEN, VARIETIES OF LIBERALIZATION AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SOCIAL
SOLIDARITY 5, 9-10, 194, 203-07 (2014); Jonas Pontusson, Comparative Political Economy of
Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions, 32 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 281, 289-90 (2002); Michael Wallerstein, Wage Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in
Advanced Industrial Societies, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 669, 672-76 (1999).
17
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compete for labor.18 This rarely occurs under our current regime. In contrast, social
bargaining directly affects wages throughout the labor market; agreements apply to all
employers in the industry or region, helping create more wage compression over all.19
Indeed, comparative studies suggest that, from the perspective of creating egalitarian
outcomes at the societal level, the critical factor in a labor law regime is the establishment
of broadly inclusive union organizations empowered to negotiate sectorally.20
Second, social bargaining increases workers’ voice in public policy decisions.21
Social bargaining gives worker organizations an official seat at the table when policy
decisions affecting workers are made. More generally, worker organizations’ broader
mandate enhances their incentive and ability to serve as a counterweight to organized
business interests in the political sphere. And giving worker organizations, as well as
businesses, a formal role in setting social welfare policy could be a particularly helpful
tool if, as predicted, automation becomes more prevalent and more bargaining about
income must occur directly with the state.
Third, social bargaining responds well to the increasing problem of the fissured
employer.22 Workers throughout an economic sector bargain together, whether employed
by a lead firm, a contracted firm, or a temporary agency. This avoids protracted legal
battles about the identity of the employer and provides a disincentive for companies to
subcontract with the aim of reducing labor costs. Likewise, social bargaining can
potentially cover both independent contractors and employees, minimizing battles over
worker classification.
Finally, social bargaining takes most disputes about wages and benefits outside of
the workplace, potentially facilitating collaborative relationships between workers and
firm managers.23 Relatedly, it addresses several of the efficiency-based objections to
collective bargaining by changing the topics over which much bargaining occurs.24

18

Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 699 (2013).
See Pontusson, supra note 16; Wallerstein, supra note 16.
20
Thelen, supra note 16, at 204-07; see also SILVIA, supra note 8, at 41 (emphasizing the
central role the law and state institutions play in sustaining the German industrial relations
system).
21
Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of
American Labor Relations,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 40-43 (1990).
22
Andrias, supra note 5, at 78.
23
MADLAND, FUTURE OF WORKER VOICE, supra note 5.
24
Dimick, supra note 18, at 692 (explaining that when union structures are highly
decentralized and firm-based, the rational response of unions is to advocate for “seniority-based
layoff policies, job definitions and demarcations, internal labor markets, rules limiting employer
discretion over technology, manning and staffing requirements, and so forth”).
19
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As previously noted, achieving a system of social bargaining at the federal level
is, at least in the near term, impossible.25 Yet states and localities can make some
progress toward the vision by creating tripartite administrative structures that include
representatives from worker organizations, business groups, and the general public who
then negotiate over such employment law standards as minimum wages, benefits, health
and safety, and scheduling.
One might wonder whether creating tripartite administrative mechanisms at the
state or local level is worth the trouble, absent the ability to enact a system of full-fledged
mandatory sectoral bargaining and greater protections for concerted activity. After all, if
workers have enough political power to enact a tripartite commission structure at the state
or municipal level, wouldn’t they be better off just legislating higher wages or better
standards? Moreover, don’t tripartite commissions just create another forum in which
workers have to marshal scarce resources, competing with more powerful companies?
There is some force to these critiques. Statutory gains are stickier than administrative
gains. Certainly, it would be foolish to forsake lasting legislative victories for temporary
administrative achievements more easily abolished by a hostile executive. And without a
shift in power dynamics, tripartite commissions can, like other governmental fora, be
dominated by elites.26
Nonetheless, both U.S. history and experience abroad suggest that tripartite
administrative processes, if well structured, offer advantages over a purely legislative
approach. At the most basic level, administrative processes offer states and localities the
ability to address workplace issues with specificity and expertise, as well as the capacity
to proceed with reform even in periods of legislative gridlock. Moreover, the tripartite
approach in particular can improve the chances of lasting gains for workers while
enhancing civil society and civic participation more broadly.27 This is because tripartite
commissions can increase worker organizations’ role in decisions about the political
economy while extending the fruits of bargaining to more workers. They can provide a
forum for workers’ collective engagement in workplace issues while sending a message
about the legitimacy of worker organizations. As such, tripartite processes can facilitate

25

On the long history of labor law’s ossification and the difficulty of reform, see Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1611-12 (2002).
26
On the dominance of economic elites in U.S. government see, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS,
UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 2, 285 (2008);
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER
IN AMERICA 79-81, 157-58 (2012); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY CHORUS:
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69-95
(2012).
27
On history of tripartism in the U.S., see Andrias, supra note 5, at 17-18; Andrias, supra
note 11; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT 271-98 (1995). On
possible ways to structure tripartite commissions, see infra Part III.
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organizing efforts.28 One might recall the CIO message that, “the President wants YOU
to join the union!”29 In addition to signaling the legitimacy of worker organizations,
tripartite commissions can signal the vulnerability of employers to regulation. As
scholars have shown, when law demonstrates that those in power are subject to a higher
authority, law has the potential to open space for mobilization.30 Finally, if, as discussed
below, tripartite commissions are combined with other reforms that build power for
worker organizations, they can be a critical step in constructing a more egalitarian
regime.31
II.

Existing Mechanisms for Social Bargaining

How might social bargaining be operationalized at the state and local level under
existing law? For the most part, state and local minimum employment standards are set
legislatively or by traditional regulatory mechanisms.32 However, a few states, including
California, New Jersey, and New York, already vest the power to set wages or other
standards with tripartite commissions, i.e., boards with representation from employee
groups, industry groups, and the public.33 These commissions provide an existing
foothold for social bargaining.

28

See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing NY example); Andrias, supra
note 11 (discussing ways in which wage boards facilitated organizing in the 1930s and 40s).
29
See IRVING BERSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER,
1933-1941, at 41 (1969) (quoting CIO organizers).
30
Benjamin Sachs, Law, Organizing, and Status Quo Vulnerability, 96 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (analyzing sociological research and applying to labor law debates).
31
See infra Part III.
32
That is, a few states grant executive branch actors the power to raise wages or regulate
hours in particular sectors of the economy following public hearings. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 151 § 7 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 34-06-01 to 08 (West 2014); see also
statutes collected infra note 33. For public hearing requirements, see, e.g, CAL. LAB. CODE §
1178.5; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-6-108, -109; N.D. CODE ANN § 34-08.
33
See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 70–74, 1173, 1178 (West 2011) (authorizing an Industrial Welfare
Commission, appointed by the governor, and composed of two representatives of employers, two
from recognized labor organizations, and one from the general public; requiring commission to
review adequacy of minimum wage every two years; and providing for industry specific wage
boards); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-6-109 (authorizing a wage board comprised of an equal number
of employer, employee, and public representatives); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7
(establishing the “New Jersey Minimum Wage Advisory Commission” with “five members as
follows: the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, ex officio, who shall serve as
chair of the commission, and four members appointed by the Governor as follows: two persons
who shall be nominated by organizations who represent the interests of the business community
in this State and two persons who shall be nominated by the New Jersey State AFL-CIO”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a8, a9 (providing that commissioner may establish a wage board to set
minimum rates for employees in particular occupations; such boards shall be composed of equal
numbers of employer, employee, and public representatives). Arizona law also permits the
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For example, California law provides for an Industrial Welfare Commission
(IWC) composed of two union representatives, two employer representatives, and one
representative from the general public.34 The governor appoints each of the five
members with the consent of the Senate, and members serve four-year terms.35 The labor
representatives must be drawn from “members of recognized labor organizations.”36 The
IWC’s authority goes beyond creating a basic minimum wage: It has authority to evaluate
wages in “any occupation, trade, or industry” to ensure they are adequate “to supply the
cost of proper living”; it also can consider whether “the hours or conditions of labor” are
“prejudicial to the health, morals, or welfare of employees.”37 If the IWC determines that
wages, hours, or working conditions are inadequate, it selects a wage board—again
composed of two labor and two employer representatives, along with a neutral party—to
investigate and make recommendations.38 Recommendations that receive the support of
two-thirds of the wage board’s members are incorporated into IWC proposed regulations,
which are then subject to public hearings.39 If approved, the orders become part of the
California Code of Regulation.40 Using this process, the IWC has issued seventeen
orders: twelve industry orders, three occupation orders, an order that applies to any
industry or occupation not previously exempt by the IWC’s wage orders effective as of
1997, and one general minimum wage order.41
New Jersey’s tripartite Minimum Wage Advisory Commission (WAC or
Commission) is charged with annually evaluating the state’s minimum wage.42 As in
California, the governor appoints the Commission’s members and is required to choose
representatives from business and labor. To that end, New Jersey law incorporates a
representative mechanism, specifying that the business representatives “shall be
nominated by organizations who represent the interests of the business community in this
State” and that the labor representatives “shall be nominated by the New Jersey State

establishment of a tripartite wage board, but only to address wages of minors. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23–314.
34
CAL. LAB. CODE. § 70.1 (West 2011). The IWC dates to 1913, but until the 1970s applied
to women and child workers only. See Indus. Welfare Comm. v. Superior Court, 613 P.2d 579,
583-84 (Cal. 1980).
35
CAL. LAB. CODE. § 70.
36
Id. § 70.1.
37
Id. § 1178.
38
Id. §§ 1178, 1178.5.
39
Id. § 1178.5(c).
40
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11531 (West, Westlaw through Register 2017, No. 44).
41
Department of Industrial Relations, IWC Wage Orders-Prior, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/wageorderindustriesprior.htm.
42
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7 et seq. (West 2016); Id. § 34:11-56a4.8(a). See also
Minimum Wage Advisory Commission, STATE OF N.J., DEP’T OF LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV.,
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lwdhome/MinWageCommission.html (describing mission of
Commission and collecting annual reports).
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AFL-CIO.”43 Unlike in California, however, the Commission has no representatives
from the public; instead, the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development fills
that function and serves as the Commission’s chair. And WAC does not have authority
over benefits or working conditions. The law does, however, allow the Commissioner to
establish sectoral wage boards, composed of labor and business representatives, which
then recommend minimum wages in particulars sectors. Wage boards can be established
if the Commissioner believes “that a substantial number of employees in any occupation
or occupations are receiving less than a fair wage.”44 The law also provides for a public
hearing process after which the Commissioner decides whether to approve or reject the
report.45
To date, the experience with state-level tripartite commissions has been mixed.
Some wage boards, including Colorado’s, appear to have been moribund for years.46 In
other states, like California and New York, wage boards have been used successfully at
times. However, no commission is actively or aggressively setting employment
standards today. Indeed, the California IWC has been without funding since 2004.47 The
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement continues to enforce the existing
wage orders, and the legislature has not repealed the IWC’s statutory responsibilities, but
the current status of the IWC can be characterized as an unfunded legislative mandate.48
In New York, the Fight for $15 movement recently used the state wage board
with success. In 2015, after growing protests and strikes organized by the Fight for $15,
and at the request of Governor Andrew Cuomo, the NY labor commissioner exercised his
authority to impanel a wage board to recommend higher wages in the fast food industry.49
43

N.J. STAT. ANN. Id. § 34:11-56a4.7.
Id. § 34:11-56a8.
45
Id. § 34:11-56a16.
46
See supra note 33.
47
Department of Industrial Relations, Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC), STATE OF
CALIFORNIA http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/. Disagreement between the California State Legislature,
which wanted to increase the minimum wage, and the IWC, which did not, led the legislature to
defund the IWC on July 1, 2004. The IWC remains defunded today, and its website states that
“[t]he IWC is currently not in operation.”
48
Victoria Bradshaw, Raise the Wage Threshold but Don’t Put It on Autopilot, CAPITOL
WEEKLY (June 8, 2006), http://capitolweekly.net/raise-the-wage-threshold-but-dont-put-it-onautopilot/.
49
Andrew M. Cuomo, Opinion, Fast Food Workers Deserve a Raise, N.Y. TIMES (May 6,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/opinion/andrew-m-cuomo-fast-food-workersdeserve-a-raise.html. As Cuomo noted, the New York Legislature had rejected his proposal to
raise the minimum wage statutorily. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 654 (McKinney 2016); Id. § 655(1) (“A
wage board shall be composed of not more than three representatives of employers, an equal
number of representatives of employees and an equal number of persons selected from the
general public.”); Mario J. Musolino, Acting Comm’r Labor, Determination Regarding Adequacy
of
Wages,
N.Y.
DEP’T
LAB.
(May
7,
2015),
44
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The Board Members—representatives from labor, business, and the general public—held
hearings over the next forty-five days, across the state. 50 Workers organized by the Fight
for $15 participated in great numbers at these hearings.51 On July 21, the Board
announced its decision: $15 per hour for fast food restaurants that are part of chains with
at least thirty outlets, to be phased in over the course of six years, with a faster phase-in
for New York City.52 The wage board order was a significant victory, followed by
another victory: a bill to raise the state-wide minimum wage to $15. However, in the
negotiations over the state-wide minimum, employers successfully mobilized to strip the
Commissioner’s authority to establish higher minimums for particular occupations.
Thus, the ultimate compromise bill curtailed the powers of future tripartite wage boards.53
Still, the New York experience shows how tripartite structures can be used to engage
workers in setting terms of work for entire industries.
The New York example aside, where wage boards have operated, the potential for
social bargaining has often been under-realized. Unions have not frequently engaged the
commissions through wide spread mobilization, testimony, and collective action. The
boards, as currently conceived, also have structural limitations. The ability of workers to
use wage boards to their benefit largely depends on the identity of the governor in the
state; he or she influences when such boards act and who constitutes them. Thus, in
California, for example, former Governor Schwarzengger tried to use the wage board to
limit the legislature’s proposal to index the minimum wage.54 Moreover, in most cases,
the neutral representatives on the commissions effectively decide disagreements. These
individuals, selected by the partisan governors, serve as the swing votes and thereby
minimize the extent to which true bargaining occurs. This weakness is pronounced when
there is no broader worker mobilization exerting pressure on the commissions.
http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/Determination_wages_05071
5.pdf.
50
Fast
Food
Wage
Board,
N.Y.
DEP’T
LAB.
http://labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/wageboard2015.shtm.
51
FAST FOOD WAGE BD., N.Y. DEP’T OF LAB., REPORT OF THE FAST FOOD WAGE BOARD TO
THE NYS COMMISSIONER OF LABOR 10-11 (2015).
52
Patrick McGeehan, Push to Lift Minimum Wage Is Now Serious Business, N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2015).
53
N.Y. L. 2016, ch. 54, part K, § 4. Existing wage orders remain in effect and New York law
still allows the Commission to act regarding hours. See id. § 5; Nat’l Rest. Ass’n v. Comm’r of
Labor, 34 N.Y.S. 3d 232, 235-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (discussing legislative history).
54
See Erica Muñoz, Raising the California Minimum Wage is Not Enough: Creating a
Sustainable Wage By Accounting For Inflation Through Indexing, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 423
(2007); Bradshaw, supra note 48; Majorie Fochtman, From the Experts: Will the Revival of
California’s Industrial Welfare Commission Reduce the Explosion of Wage and Hour Litigation
for
California
Employers?,
HR
DAILY
(Mar.
1,
2007),
http://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2007/03/01/from-the-experts-will-the-revival-of-california-sindustrial-welfare-commission-reduce-the-explosion-of-wage-and-hour-litigation-for-californiaemployers/.
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Nonetheless, more could be done to use existing wage boards aggressively, as was
done by the Fight for $15 in New York. In jurisdictions where worker organizations have
significant political influence, and where the executive branch is amenable, workers can
petition wage boards to act. Where statutes permit, they can demand sector-by-sector
wage and benefit improvements, beyond minimum wage increases. They can also
engage workers in collective action designed to achieve such gains, as the Fight for $15
did in New York.
III.

Expanding Tripartite Commissions, Increasing Civic Participation, and
Building Worker Power

Progressive states and localities could also create more ambitious, participatory,
and representative tripartite commissions. A range of possibilities is worth exploring.
First, state laws, or local laws where home rule power is sufficient, could give tripartite
commissions broader mandates on a sector-by-sector basis, making clear that authority is
not limited to setting a single minimum wage. Sector-by-sector wages, benefits, working
conditions, leave policies, and scheduling rights could all be included in the scope of the
commissions’ work.
Second, to respond to concerns about the transient nature of administrative gains,
the laws could make clear that the statutory mandate is to provide for a living wage and
quality benefits. They could impose a cost of living wage increase as a default, or other
default increases, creating a floor above which commissions would act. The statutes
could also require commissions to act periodically rather than only upon executive branch
request or public petition, and could require super-majority votes for any decisions not to
raise wages or improve benefits as scheduled.
To ensure that the commission process actually involves representative worker
organizations, the laws could further provide, building on the New Jersey model, that the
composition of the commissions includes the elected leadership of NLRB-certified
unions, other membership-based non-profit worker organizations in the particular sector,
as well as leaders of the relevant industry groups and firms. The commissions would
require multiple representatives on both the worker and business side, depending on the
size and diversity of the particular sector. Another possibility would be to create systems
by which workers throughout an industry could vote for representatives, selecting from
among a slate of worker organizations; winners would then send representatives to serve
on the commissions on a proportional basis.
New tripartite commissions also might cabin the power of the governor, state
labor commissioner, or local executive over substantive outcomes in order to ensure that
real social bargaining occurs. For example, the laws could create evenly split
commissions, incorporating an arbitration process in the event of a stalemate, subject to
state or local governmental review; they could require that the neutral representative on
the board be selected jointly by worker organizations and business groups from a list of
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approved arbitrators; or they could even establish a mechanism for consumer or public
representation through a new democratic process encouraging the growth of membershipbased consumer organizations.
Whether through existing or new statutes, collective action by workers is an
essential component of effective social bargaining. Absent worker participation, tripartite
commissions offer little promise. To that end, the success of wage boards depends on
active organizing efforts by worker organizations. Workers engaged in such efforts
would be entitled to protection under Section 7 of the NLRA, which protects concerted
action, even through political channels and even among unorganized workers.55 Thus,
workers could, as they did in New York, testify before wage boards, demonstrate in favor
of certain results, and organize their co-workers. Section 7 protects such activity even if
the workers are not union members or seeking to form a union—as long as participation
does not constitute unprotected or illegal activity.56 The statute also protects concerted
political organizing in the workplace, as long as it occurs off duty, in a nondisruptive
manner, and is otherwise in accordance with nondiscriminatory work rules.
Of course, existing penalties for employer violations of Section 7 are weak.57
Moreover, the current interpretation of Section 7 does not protect workers who withhold
their labor in support of their wage and benefit demands unless those demands are
directed at their employer.58 Nor does it protect workers who engage in partial strikes,
planned intermittent work stoppages, or secondary economic activity to advance their
demands.59 This doctrine has been persuasively critiqued,60 though Board and Court
55

See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); see also Memorandum from Ronald
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Officers, Memorandum GC 08-10 (July 22, 2008) (providing guidelines for how to handle unfair
labor practice charges involving political activity arising out of immigration rallies).
56
Andrias, supra note 5, at nn. 120-25 and accompanying text.
57
See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983).
58
See Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, supra note 55, at 10-11 (citing Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 n.18 (1978) (stating, in dicta, that “[t]he argument that the employer's
lack of interest or control affords a legitimate basis for holding that a subject does not come
within ‘mutual aid or protection’ is unconvincing. The argument that economic pressure should
be unprotected in such cases is more convincing.”)).
59
See Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, supra note 55, at 12.
60
See, e.g., Craig Becker, “Better Than A Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 377-78 (1994); Seth
Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685, 752
(1985); see also Marion Crain & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1791
(arguing that freedom of assembly should be a source of legal protection for labor unions and
worker advocacy efforts); Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First
Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277 (2015) (arguing for broader First Amendment
protection).

11

reinterpretation seems unlikely in the near term. In the meantime, worker organizations
can structure their actions so that they fall within the protections of existing law.
Finally, to function well, tripartite commissions should be combined with reforms
that protect the right to organize and that strengthen worker organizations. To be sure,
many reforms to that end would require federal legislation or a change in preemption
doctrine.61 For example, states cannot, when regulating employees and employers
covered by the NLRA, increase penalties for violations of the NLRA, nor can they
prohibit permanent replacements or protect secondary boycotts, or establish a system of
works councils. However, a few non-preempted reforms at the state and local level can
accompany tripartite commissions. One promising example is the recent New York City
law that gives employees the option of deducting contributions to qualified nonprofit
organizations that will advocate for workers but without engaging in traditional collective
bargaining with employers.62 Other examples are laws that require the state or locality to
compensate representatives for participation in wage boards, co-enforcement efforts like
those described by Professors Fisk and Patel for this conference,63 and proposals to
engage worker organizations in more benefit administration.64
IV.

Legal Challenges to State and Local Tripartite Commissions for
Employees

Greater use of tripartite commissions at the state and local level would
undoubtedly come under legal challenge—but the best reading of the law supports a
conclusion that such regimes are permissible.65
1. Federal Labor Law Preemption. Employers or other aggrieved parties would
likely challenge both state and local legislation on NLRA preemption grounds. The Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not preempt state and local wage legislation, as long as
the non-federal benefits exceed the floors set by federal statutes.66 States can pass, for
example, higher minimum wages, more protective scheduling laws, and paid sick time
provisions; so too can localities, as long as their home rule provisions permit them to do
so. But opponents of social bargaining could potentially argue that once states or
localities allow extensive social bargaining over wages and other terms or conditions in
particular industries, they have entered the field of labor-management relations and are
therefore subject to NLRA preemption.
61

See infra Section IV.1 (discussing preemption doctrine).
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63
See Fisk & Patel, supra note 2.
64
See Dimick, supra note 3.
65
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66
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In contrast to the FLSA, the NLRA’s preemption regime is extremely broad.67
There are two key cases. First, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon holds that
states are prohibited from regulating activity that is even “arguably” protected or
prohibited by federal law.68 Second, Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission69 holds that Congress’s decision to leave
certain activity unregulated by the NLRA implied Congress’s intent that these forms of
union and employer conduct be left completely unregulated.70 Where Congress left
conduct “to be controlled by the free play of economic forces,”71 the states, like the
NLRB, cannot regulate it.72
Opponents of tripartite commissions could invoke Garmon, arguing that tripartite
commissions require mandatory multi-employer bargaining, while the NLRA protects
employers’ rights not to participate in such bargaining. They might also argue that the
NLRA expressly protects the right to refrain from unionization, and that wage boards
effectively defeat that right. In addition, opponents could rely on Machinists, claiming
that local or state tripartite commissions engage in a form of collective bargaining over
which the state exercises substantive control. And, the argument would run, the NLRA
clearly leaves the substantive outcome of bargaining “to be controlled by the free play of
economic forces.”73
Though one should not underestimate the risk of a negative ruling given the
Supreme Court’s current composition, a preemption finding under either Garmon or
Machinists would represent a significant departure from existing doctrine. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized the prohibition against state actors shifting the balance
of power in privately negotiated agreements,74 but it has never curtailed the ability of
states and local governments to pass universally applicable employment legislation.
Indeed, the Court has held that laws of general applicability are not preempted even when
they “alter[] the economic balance between labor and management.”75 The Court has
67

Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 374-94 (1990). For a summary of labor preemption
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and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1164-69 (2011).
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359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959).
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427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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Id. at 141 (citing NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960), and
Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 382 U.S. 181, 187 (1965)).
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Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
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Id. at 144, 149-50.
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13

also emphasized that, “When a state law establishes a minimal employment standard not
inconsistent with the general legislative goals of the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the
purposes of the Act.”76 Thus, the Court has upheld several state laws establishing
workplace standards that would otherwise be negotiated in bargaining.77
In the case of tripartite commissions, unions would not be obtaining exclusive
bargaining agreements, multiemployer or otherwise.78 Wage board orders carry no
requirement that the workers be members of a union, abstain from a union, or join a
union. Nor do they force employers to engage in collective bargaining. Rather, tripartite
commissions involve worker organizations and businesses in setting employment law.
As courts have recognized “[i]t is now clear . . . that state substantive labor standards,
including minimum wages, are not invalidated simply because they apply to particular
trades, professions, or job classifications rather than to the entire labor market.”79 “[T]he
substantive terms of employment, which does not govern the processes of collective
bargaining or self-organization and is not inconsistent with the general goals of the
NLRA is not subject to Machinists preemption.”80
Finally, it is worth noting that the above preemption analysis applies only to
workers who fall within the NLRA’s scope. Courts have long held that states can pass
labor laws governing exempt workers—namely agricultural and domestic workers,
independent contractors, and public sector employees—without confronting preemption
policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who
have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations
imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers.”); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 20-22 (1987) (accord). The California Supreme Court has rejected a labor law preemption
challenge to its state’s wage commission. Indus. Welfare Comm’n v. Superior Court, 613 P.2d
579, 600-01 (Cal. 1980) (emphasizing states’ authority to go beyond the federal legislation in
adopting more protective regulations for the benefit of employees). For similar reasons, under
current doctrine, a First Amendment challenge should fail. Any effect on the expressive interests
of employers or objecting workers would be indirect. See Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S.
360, 360-61 (1988) (holding that a statute denying food stamps to striking workers does not
directly and substantially interfere with First Amendment rights).
76
Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 756-57 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
77
See Coyne, 482 U.S. at 20-22 (1987) (requiring a one-time severance payment to
employees upon the closing of any plant employing over 100 workers); Metro. Life, 471 U.S. 724
(1985) (approving a state statute requiring all general health insurance policies or employee
health-care plans that covered hospital and surgical expenses to also include minimum mental
health-care benefits).
78
Cf. Sachs, supra note 67 (discussing preemption arguments with respect to tripartite
negotiations that result in privately negotiated agreements).
79
Associated Builders & Contractors of S. Cal., Inc. v. Nunn, 356 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir.
2004), amended, No. 02-56735, 2004 WL 292128 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2004).
80
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 485, 497-98 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 758, and rejecting reasoning of Chamber of Commerce of
U.S. v. Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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doctrine.81 For those workers, more ambitious sectoral bargaining, along with more
protections for concerted action, could be enacted, subject to other legal constraints,
discussed below.
2. Equal Protection and Dormant Commerce Clause. Opponents are also likely to
argue that tripartite commissions violate the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment and parallel state provisions and/or the federal dormant
commerce clauses. These arguments have been easily dismissed: the statutes have a
rational basis and do not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state businesses.82
Expansion of the scope of tripartite board activity is unlikely to change either analysis.
3. Separation of Powers. A third line of challenge sounds in separation of powers
law. To date, opponents have gained little traction on claims that wage boards
excessively delegate power to the executive branch or to private parties. The statutes
have survived review because they set forth a clear legislative policy position that cabins
decisionmaking authority by the executive; they maintain ultimate decisionmaking
authority in public officials, not in private parties; and they contain mechanisms to guard
against arbitrary and capricious action.83 Any expansion of social bargaining at the state
81
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83
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15

or local level would have to maintain these basic characteristics.84 Thus, in states with
separation-of-powers and administrative law doctrine that roughly parallel federal law, it
would be critical that any tripartite wage statute set forth an “intelligible principle” and
that ultimate decisionmaking authority rest with a state official, not with private parties.
4. Home Rule and State Preemption. A fourth, and more significant, obstacle is
that hostile state governments can eliminate the ability of localities to enact social
bargaining statutes. Municipal corporations are subdivisions of the state and only have
authority to enact laws if the state has granted them such powers.85 Accordingly, state
governments can deny localities authority to engage in social bargaining or can overrule
particular social bargaining that occurs at the local level. In circumstances where state
government is more conservative than city or county government, elimination of home
rule powers or rejection of particular regulations is a real danger.86 The threat may be
pronounced where the locality is governed by a racial minority group lacking effective
representation at the state level.87 For example, the Alabama legislature voted to nullify a
City of Birmingham law that would have set the city’s minimum wage at $10.10.88
Missouri recently rolled back St. Louis’ $10-an-hour minimum wage ordinance.89 Ohio’s
legislature recently enacted a statute prohibiting localities from raising their minimum
wages higher than the statewide minimum, in anticipation of the City of Cleveland’s
scheduled vote to increase the city’s minimum wage to $15 an hour (the statute was
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ultimately struck down).90 Several other states have passed or are considering similar
legislation, bringing the total number of states with laws that prohibit local wage
ordinances to twenty-five.91
5. Antitrust. A final possible challenge comes from antitrust law—though this too
should fail under existing precedent. The Sherman Act makes unlawful “every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy[] in restraint of trade,” and punishes the act of
“monopoliz[ing], or attempt[ing] to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce”
among states.92 Thus, private actors are prohibited from agreeing or otherwise colluding
to achieve anticompetitive ends. Agreements between individuals that directly affect
prices are considered “per se” illegal.93 The antitrust laws, however, contain a labor
exemption, which makes clear that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.94 An additional judicially
crafted “non-statutory” labor exemption extends to parties who enter into agreements
with unions.95
Opponents to social bargaining statutes might argue that, because the labor
exemption is not currently understood to cover independent contractors, social bargaining
statutes governing such workers would violate the antitrust law.96 This argument should
fail, however, because statutes allowing social bargaining by independent contractors
90
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would fall squarely within the “state action” exception to the antitrust laws.97 That
exemption, also known as Parker immunity, allows states to enact anticompetitive
regulation when acting in their sovereign capacities. 98 In establishing a wage board, or
enabling a locality to establish a wage board, for independent contractors the state would
be “clearly articulat[ing] and affirmatively express[ing] state policy.” 99 Moreover, the
wage boards would be actively supervised by state officials, with state officials retaining
authority to veto decisions that violate state policy.100
CONCLUSION
In this era of striking economic and political inequality, reforming labor and
employment law and rebuilding worker organizations are essential. With federal reform
not currently possible, engaging workers and their organizations in state and local
tripartite commissions is a step in the right direction. When combined with active worker
organizing efforts and additional reforms that strengthen worker organization, state and
local tripartism can function as an important building block of a more egalitarian and
democratic workplace law.
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